>If I use a virtual PC, with no virtual NIC, to access files I know to
>contain viruses, are there any riska at all that that virus could move from
>the virtual PC to the physical one?
>
>I am assuming not but want to check before I do it.
>
>Thanks
>

>On Mon, 09 Feb 2009 10:19:49 -0500, Robert Comer
><(email address - cut out)> wrote:
>
>>To be safe, you have to make sure no folders are shared either,or
>>better yet, don't install the VPC additions, but otherwise there's no
>>way I know of that something could break out of a VM if there was no
>>networking setup.
>
>How could a malicious file enter the VM without any networking or
>shared folders or drag-n-drop?
>Via the floppy drive perhaps?
>Sounds a bit academic....

>To be safe, you have to make sure no folders are shared either,or
>better yet, don't install the VPC additions, but otherwise there's no
>way I know of that something could break out of a VM if there was no
>networking setup.

> On Mon, 09 Feb 2009 10:19:49 -0500, Robert Comer
>
> <(email address - cut out)> wrote:
> >To be safe, you have to make sure no folders are shared either,or
> >better yet, don't install the VPC additions, but otherwise there's no
> >way I know of that something could break out of a VM if there was no
> >networking setup.
>
> How could a malicious file enter the VM without any networking or
> shared folders or drag-n-drop?
> Via the floppy drive perhaps?
> Sounds a bit academic....
>
> --
>
> Bo Berglund (Sweden)

>To be safe, you have to make sure no folders are shared either,or
>better yet, don't install the VPC additions, but otherwise there's no
>way I know of that something could break out of a VM if there was no
>networking setup.

>hardware devices could potentially expose an exploitable buffer overrun.
>In message <(email address - cut out)> Robert Comer
><(email address - cut out)> was claimed to have wrote:
>
>>To be safe, you have to make sure no folders are shared either,or
>>better yet, don't install the VPC additions, but otherwise there's no
>>way I know of that something could break out of a VM if there was no
>>networking setup.
>
>Actually, thinking about this a bit more, a bug any of the emulated
>hardware devices could potentially expose an exploitable buffer overrun.
>
>It hasn't happened yet, but there is no reason that it can't happen.

> Thanks everyone.
>
> It's a little but more ambiguous than I thought it might be it would seem=
>
> Maybe I would be better resorting to completely seperate hardware when
> working on known infected files. =A0That sounds like the only sure way of
> avoiding "potential" crossover.
>
> "K" <(email address - cut out)> wrote in message
>
> news:(email address - cut out)...
>
> > If I use a virtual PC, with no virtual NIC, to access files I know to
> > contain viruses, are there any riska at all that that virus could move
> > from the virtual PC to the physical one?
>
> > I am assuming not but want to check before I do it.
>
> > Thanks

>>Actually, thinking about this a bit more, a bug any of the emulated
>>hardware devices could potentially expose an exploitable buffer overrun.
>
>You'd have to get through two layers to do it, the driver level (not
>many driver level exploits) in the VM, and then through the VPC app
>itself on the host. It's not all that likely, but I suppose it's
>possible. I don't know how VPC is coded, but it's possible also it's
>programmed in a way that wouldn't allow a buffer overrun.
>
>So in other words, your guess is as good as mine. <g>

>Thanks everyone.
>
>It's a little but more ambiguous than I thought it might be it would seem.
>
>Maybe I would be better resorting to completely seperate hardware when
>working on known infected files. That sounds like the only sure way of
>avoiding "potential" crossover.

>In message <#357m$(email address - cut out)> "K" <(email address - cut out)> was
>claimed to have wrote:
>
>>Thanks everyone.
>>
>>It's a little but more ambiguous than I thought it might be it would seem.
>>
>>Maybe I would be better resorting to completely seperate hardware when
>>working on known infected files. That sounds like the only sure way of
>>avoiding "potential" crossover.
>
>Personally, despite my doubt that the barrier can't be crossed, I trust
>VMs enough to work with viruses inside a guest on a regular basis.
>
>Odds are good that when this barrier is cracked it will be *huge* news.

> If I use a virtual PC, with no virtual NIC, to access files I know to
> contain viruses, are there any riska at all that that virus could move
> from the virtual PC to the physical one?
>
> I am assuming not but want to check before I do it.
>
> Thanks
>

>On Tue, 10 Feb 2009 12:28:22 -0800, Dave Warren
><(email address - cut out)> wrote:
>
>>In message <#357m$(email address - cut out)> "K" <(email address - cut out)> was
>>claimed to have wrote:
>>
>>>Thanks everyone.
>>>
>>>It's a little but more ambiguous than I thought it might be it would seem.
>>>
>>>Maybe I would be better resorting to completely seperate hardware when
>>>working on known infected files. That sounds like the only sure way of
>>>avoiding "potential" crossover.
>>
>>Personally, despite my doubt that the barrier can't be crossed, I trust
>>VMs enough to work with viruses inside a guest on a regular basis.
>>
>>Odds are good that when this barrier is cracked it will be *huge* news.
>
>Needs the VMWare tools installed though...
>http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9064319&source=rss_topic17